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Abstract
We show that generosity is affected when we vary the level of role uncertainty, i.e., the
probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters
for generosity in that subjects are less generous when they are told that their choices will be
implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which they are told that
their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.
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1 Introduction
People may be more likely to exhibit pro-social or generous behavior when they perceive it is
unlikely that their choices will be implemented, while more selfish or self-interested behavior may
be observed when people perceive that their actions are likely to have economic consequences for
others. This can be observed when people face uncertain commitments; e.g., helping a relative who
is sick or a friend who need to move, etc. In fact, there is ample evidence that people may want
to appear as fair to feel better themselves or to receive recognition from others (Andreoni, 1990;
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Dana et al., 2007; Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017).
Our results suggest that both the framing and the level of role uncertainty affect generosity.
These findings add the current literature on various fronts. When eliciting generous behavior,
researchers have either employed the standard dictator game (in which there is no role uncertainty)
or random dictator games (in which all participants make their choices as if they were dictators
and then only half of the choices are implemented). There is also a bunch of papers that examine
generosity in risky dictator games in which dictators choose between a “safe option” and a “risky
option” or probabilistic dictator games in which dictators redistribute probabilities of winning a
prize (Dana et al., 2007; Cettolin et al., 2017; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Karni et al., 2008;
Brock et al., 2013; Saito, 2013; Exley, 2016). Yet the experimental evidence that examines how
role uncertainty influences generous behavior is very limited. In fact, the only exception we know
is Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) who find in a repeated game that selfish choices are more frequent
when there is no role uncertainty (i.e., when participants know who will be the dictator), while
altruistic choices are more frequent when there is role uncertainty (i.e., when participants do not
know who will be the dictator).1 We build on their work to show that the probability of being
the choice being implemented and the framing of the decision are key to explain generosity in a
one-shot dictator game. Our results also contribute to the experimental evidence that shows that
framing affects generosity (Capraro and Vanzo, 2019; Brañas-Garza, 2007). In particular, we argue
that framing choices as dictators or recipients may affect the feelings of ownership and this may
have consequences for giving.
1As already noted in Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) choices under role uncertainty differ from choices under the veil
of ignorance (Rawls, 1971; Harsanyi, 1977) as the latter implies that the decision-makers’ choices will be implemented
but they do not know what their final role in the game would be; i.e., decision-makers under the veil of ignorance
do not know whether they will receive the payoff associated to the dictator or the recipient. See Frignani and Ponti
(2012) for decisions under the veil of ignorance in the dictator game.
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2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
2.1 Experimental design
We rely on the strategy method and present subjects with a multiple probability list (MPL) dic-
tator game in which subjects are asked to split an endowment of 10€ between themselves and
another participant. Each subjects make a total of 11 choices. In the Dictator-Frame, subjects are
confronted with the probability p ∈ {1, 0.9, ..., 0.1, 0} that their choices will be implemented (with
the remaining probability they will be selected as recipients, thus their choice will not be imple-
mented). In the Recipient-Frame, choices vary with the probability q ∈ {1, 0.9, ..., 0.1, 0} of being
selected as recipients; i.e., subjects are presented with the probability that their choices will not be
implemented. Figure 1 presents the decision table of subjects in each frame.2 The instructions are
presented in Appendix A.
Figure 1: Decision table (MPL) in the Dictator-Frame (left-hand side) and the Recipient-Frame
(right-hand side).
At the end of the experiment, we collected a number of individual variables regarding basic
demographics (i.e., age and gender), risk preferences, cognitive reflection and taste for advantageous
and disadvantageous taste for inequality.
2Our study included two other conditions in which the probabilities of being dictator or recipient ranged from
0.9 to 0.1. Our findings are robust to these probabilities, but the interested reader can consult Mesa-Vázquez et al.
(2019) for further details.
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2.2 Procedures
The experiment was held at the Universidad de Sevilla in April 2019. A total of 88 students
with no previous experience participated in our experiment. Students were placed in two different
rooms and received the instructions for the Dictator-Frame (N = 44) or the Recipient-Frame (N
= 44). To pay participants, we randomly matched them in pairs and selected one of the rows
for payment. We then implemented either the “dictator” or the “recipient” choice depending on
the probabilities associated to the selected row by extracting a second ball from a different urn.3
Participants received 5 Euros as show-up payment.
2.3 Hypotheses
The theoretical prediction under the assumption that subjects are purely selfish is that they will
give nothing away, regardless of their role in the game or the probability that their choices will be
implemented; thus all choices should be the same in the MPLs. Our main hypothesis, however, is
that giving decreases with the probability that the decision will be implemented, thus subjects in
the role of dictators or recipients are expected to give more when it is unlikely that their choices
will be implemented.
H1. Giving decreases with the probability that the decision will be implemented.
The recent article by Korenok et al. (2017) suggest that feelings of ownership can affect generos-
ity. The feelings of ownership are affected in their setting when dictators earn the endowment or
their decision is framed as giving to the recipient or taking from the recipient. In our experiment,
we attempt to affect the feelings of ownership by changing the framing of the decision. We argue
that subjects will have a have stronger feelings of ownership in the Dictator-Frame than in the
Recipient-Frame, thus subjects will give less in the role of dictators compared with giving in the
role of recipients.
H2a. Giving in the Recipient-Frame is higher than giving in the Dictator-Frame because the
frame will affect the feelings of ownership.
A second feature that can affect giving in each frame refers to the cognitive load associated to
giving. When subjects are in the Recipient-Frame, they are confronted with the probabilities that
3Imagine that row 5 was selected for payment. This implies that the choice of the Dictator-Frame (Recipient-
Frame) was implemented with a probability of 0.6 (0.4), respectively. We then extracted a ball from a different urn:
if the number was 1-6 then we implemented the decision of participant in the Dictator-Frame; otherwise, the choice
we implemented was the one of the participant in the Recipient-Frame.
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their choices will not be implemented (i.e., they have to think that choices will be implemented with
the complementary probability). This can increase their cognitive effort and may reduce giving, as
suggested in Schulz et al. (2014).4
H2b. Giving in the Recipient-Frame is lower than giving in the Dictator-Frame because of the
cognitive load associated to giving.
3 Results
Figure 2 shows the average giving in each frame, depending on the level of role uncertainty; i.e.,
the horizontal axis shows the probabilities that the decision will be implemented. In the Dictator-
Frame, this corresponds to the value of p that was presented to subjects in the MPL, while the
values for the Recipient-Frame has been transformed to indicate the probability that the choice
will be implemented; therefore the probabilities correspond to (1− q) in the MPL.5 We include in
each panel the average giving and the standard deviation, using each subject as an independent
observation. We also present the fraction of selfish allocations (i.e., giving nothing) and egalitarian
allocations (i.e., giving half).6
First, we find support for H1 that giving decreases with the probability of the choice being
implemented; i.e., the Jonckheere-Terpstra test suggests a negative trend in both frames (p <
0.001).
Result 1. Subjects give less (i.e., they are more selfish) when there is a high probability that
their choice will be implemented.
Second, when we compare the level of generosity across frames we find that subjects in the
Dictator-Frame are more generous than subjects in the Recipient-Frame (3.69 vs 4.89). The dif-
ference is statistically significant using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p < 0.001) or the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (p < 0.001). This, in turn, provides evidence in favor of H2a.7
4For evidence that the cognitive load does not affect generosity see Benjamin et al. (2013) or Hauge et al. (2016).
According to Schulz et al. (2014) the results can be explained by differences in the cognitive load; e.g., subjects in
Hauge et al. (2016) are asked to recall a seven-digit number, while subjects in Schulz et al. (2014) hear a series of
letters and have to press a button whenever they hear a character that resounded two letters before, thus the latter
task is more demanding in terms of cognitive effort.
5The choice when the probability is 0 corresponds to an hypothetical scenario in which subjects give under role
certainty knowing that their choice will not be selected for sure.
6The data underlying the study is accessible at https://x-econ.org repository of Experimental Economics (DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.23663/x2654).
7In Mesa-Vázquez et al. (2019) we show that these results are robust to an econometric analysis, where we control
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Figure 2: Giving in the Dictator-Frame (left-panel) and the Recipient-Frame (right-panel)
Result 2. Subjects in the Dictator-Frame give less (i.e., they are more selfish) than subjects in
the Recipient-Frame.
4 Conclusion
Previous research has used dictator games in which subjects know their role in the game (standard
dictator games) or they choose in the role of dictators and then a random draw determines whether
or not their choices are implemented (random dictator games in which there is role uncertainty).
While the fundamental assumption is that generous behavior will be independent of the level of
role uncertainty, we find that participants are more generous when it is unlikely that their choices
will be implemented. We also find that framing affects generosity in that subjects are less generous
when they are told that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with
a setting in which they are told that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.
We believe that these results advance our knowledge on the factors that influence generosity.
Empirically, we provide evidence in favor of our hypotheses that role uncertainty and framing affect
generosity. As a methodological implication, we share the view in Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) that
random dictator games in which there is role or strategic uncertainty should be avoided to elicit
for the information collected in our questionnaire.
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generosity. In fact, we believe that introducing this role uncertainty can be used as an excuse not
to donate in risky environments (Exley, 2016).
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Michael Kurschilgen, Sabine Erika Kröger, Daniel Zizzo, Praveen Kujal, Paul J. Halevy, Michal Krawczyk
and Matthias Greiff for their references and stimulating discussion. Finally, we acknowledge financial support
from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competition under the project ECO2016-75575-R (A. Urbano)
and the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities under projects PID2019-110790RB-I00 (A.
Urbano) and PGC2018-097875-A-I00 (Ismael Rodriguez-Lara); and the Generalitat Valenciana under the
Excellence Program Prometeo 2019/095 (A. Urbano). The usual disclaimers apply.
7
References
Andreoni, J., 1990. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving.
The Economic Journal 100, 464–477.
Andreoni, J., Bernheim, B.D., 2009. Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and experi-
mental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica 77, 1607–1636.
Benjamin, D.J., Brown, S.A., Shapiro, J.M., 2013. Who is ‘behavioral’? cognitive ability and
anomalous preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association 11, 1231–1255.
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